A funny thing is that Parlamentarianism is a happy accident. It was developed mostly in monarchies as a consequence of the legitimacy loss of the King: a smooth transfer of power from the King to the parliament chosen prime minister for several decades ended in the current arrangement.
Of course the arrangement is perfect in Scandinavia and Switzerland (a different path here), not so good in other countries. At the end the important thing is to have vote trading and plurality representation.
First pass the post and strong political parties can undo many advantages of parlamentarianism.
Do you mean strong political parties or strong partisanship? They are very different things. Strong parties are very much associated with good outcomes, while strong partisanship is detrimental. I claim that strong partisanship is a much greater risk in presidentialism because of how it incentivizes the expressive voting aspect.
I mean disciplined Parties, that is, parties where all MP vote together. With two truly disciplined parties, you have the full majoritarian scenario, and that is very similar to Presidentialism.
In the classical FPTP system, you have two parties but they are not disciplined, so there is true parlamentarían (=vote trading) politics. The current UK and US system is every day more disciplined, and then, the Parliament becomes a Chorus.
I'm critical of FPTP as well, and have become more hopeful of PR under presidentialism after recent Brazilian elections, where the most polarized leaders fared very badly compared to vanilla candidates.
Having said that, I don't think it makes a parliamentary country behave like a presidential one, even under FPTP. Personalized power is a different (and more dangerous) institution.
We are having new problems as a consequence of the destruction of local public opinion. FPTP and two party system were not that bad when local communities and news ecosystems worked as a force against partisan alignment.
In any case, for me parlamentarianism is simply a part of the consociational/majoritarian axis. This of course is not an argument against parlamentarianism, but the opposite: we understand very well why is better: it allows integration vs polarization.
1. South Korea, Taiwan, and France all seem 'fine' to me as functioning political institutions. (I understand that France is a weird hybrid, but they also have a president who is in many ways is more powerful than the US one- they can not only veto legislation but also call for early elections, institute emergency legislation unless the parliament has a super-majority, etc. So I'd certainly count them as 'presidential')
2. I don't doubt that presidentialism is maybe not an ideal system for a poorer country with weaker institutions, but I think developed countries can manage the risks just fine with appropriate controls in place (i.e. the US should really have stronger party nomination rules and not allow randos to run for their major party offices). I don't really think bicameralism or strong federalism is appropriate for new democracies either, but that doesn't mean rich countries can't handle either of those.
I.e. I would not recommend that a new democracy have 2 equally powerful chambers because this is too much friction for new institutions. But imagine telling Switzerland or Australia or the US that bicameralism leads to instability because it's not a best practice for a new African democracy. It's OK to say that some institutions are 'advanced moves for advanced players'. Same thing with an independent central bank, constitutional court, professional officer corps in the military, etc. etc.
3. You continue to not understand the benefits of presidentialism, which is around separating the presidential & legislative functions and *making it difficult to pass laws*. Philosophically it's about having a decentralized government made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates, and to get a law passed you have to persuade these disparate, sometimes fractious groups. The friction is a feature and not a bug. I don't want my legislature & executive fused, so that they can more easily pass laws, many of which will undoubtedly be dumb. Look at Gavin Newsom vetoing every foolish idea the California legislature has come up with in the past few years. Multiple veto points and friction are a good thing. The Economics Effects of Constitutions is a good book on this.
BTW, this is why the 'corporations don't have presidential systems' argument from your book doesn't work. Corporations don't need divided government, they should be actively engaged in profit-maximizing behavior. Governments are simply not corporations, frequently the best course of action for them is to do nothing, rather than pass a foolish law, give in to an influential pressure group, etc. Again, multiple veto points and friction are the point
On 1, I would point out the three countries you deemed presidential have prime ministers who are subject to confidence of parliament. In any pure presidential country, a constitution such as that of those countries would be perceived as "parliamentary". You call France "presidential" but that's not how most political scientists see it. It is most commonly classified as a premier-presidential form of semipresidentialism, which most view as behaving close to a parliamentary system. In any case, my point is not about nomenclature. You could call France presidential and countries which do not have the kind of legislative influence on the executive that France has (what I call presidential countries) some other name - hyperpresidential if you like. My argument is mainly against "hyperpresidential "countries. The idea that the president of France is more powerful than a regular president seems odd given that Macron just appointed a prime minister who has been overly critical of him - but one who was perceived to be able to keep support of parliament. But, as I write in the book, the American president is also no example of a typical president, they have fewer powers. In any case, I find that examples are good to illustrate but bad to make general points. I have never claimed it was impossible to do just fine under presidentialism nor that parliamentarism is a gurarantee of success. I claim that the odds are very different. "My grandmother smoked a pack a day and she lived one hundred years" is not an argument against the health risks of smoking.
On 2, the problem is that so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism, but countries which have been consistently parliamentary very often do. And you say that advanced economies do "just fine" with presidentialism and immediately turn to the challenges the US is facing with the system, suggesting that it is not as easy to do just fine.
On 3, I would humbly suggest that I do understand the arguments in favor of presidentialism, I just think they fail. I use Persson, Roland and Tabellini's model extensively to discuss why I think the theory for separation of powers fails, you might recall. Again, looking at example is hardly conclusive. And I would point out that having the "frictions" you mentioned hasn't stopped presidential countries from implementing all sorts of nonsense policies such as price controls. On the other hand, there is a large literature on how a lack of state capacity, an ability to act cohesively, hurts countries. You claim that corporations fail because they act in profit-maximizing behavior. This seems conveniently ad hoc. And "doing nothing" in the sense of "not taking an action" is very frequently the best course of action for a corporation. There is literature, for example, on how many will pursu mergers for the benefit of the vanity of the CEO when it does not make sense from a profit-seeking point of view. Corporations had to be legally told to be profit-seeking exactly because of the conflicts which arise in their operations. And still we see conflicts of interest among shareholders, directors and management arise all the time.
You assume I'm overly focused on the president part without providing any evidence that it is beneficial other than examples, when I have discussed the theory and the evidence at length.
Lastly, you have never addressed the points of the post itself. Would you be fine with a legislature headed by a single person? If not, why should we be ok with an executive headed by a single person?
If you are so keen on separation of powers, why not adopt Ganghoff`s proposal of a semi-parliamentary system whereby you keep the separation but with a collective executive as well. He says Australia is an example of this. I would classify them both as parliamentary, but am totally fine with his classification.
>On 1, I would point out the three countries you deemed presidential have prime ministers who are subject to confidence of parliament
Sure. And Germany, Austria, and Finland all have presidents, I wouldn't call them presidential systems. My point is that South Korea, Taiwan, and France have a directly elected president with serious political power, and the potential for conflict with a separately elected parliament. In fact, all 3 of those countries invest more power in their president than the US does. 2 out of the 3 can dismiss parliament, I believe that at least 2 out of the 3 can pass emergency legislation solely by decree in a way that's unthinkable in the US, as Macron did recently with pension reform.
What power do parliaments have in those countries that a legislature doesn't under a presidential system, can someone tell me? Maybe Macron doesn't like Bernier, also Trump didn't like Pelosi, Obama didn't like Paul Ryan and Boehner, etc. etc.
>the problem is that so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism
South Korea and Taiwan, 2 of the most economically successful countries of the last hundred years
|Sure. And Germany, Austria, and Finland all have presidents, I wouldn't call them |presidential systems
Perhaps if presidential systems led just about any measure of what a society looks for, if the introduction of presidents was associated with the great enrichment, if there were several empirical studies pointing to them being more successful, if political science theory pointed to their advantage, when someone gave three examples of successful parliamentary countries and they all happened to be those that had presidents, it would be worth pointing out.
| South Korea and Taiwan, 2 of the most economically successful countries of the last |hundred years
China has been successful, but I don't take that one example as a demonstration that being officially communist is good or even that it isn't that bad.
I'm sorry, I don't have a high opinion of political 'science' as a quantitative or empirical field, and I don't take conclusions reached from these studies very seriously. 'Countries' are not equivalent units that can be studied in this manner. Constructing some artificial metrics and then averaging all of the parliamentary or presidential systems in the world..... I'm sorry, I don't believe in this kind of stuff. I hope you don't take offense if I say that bluntly.
>China
As a veteran Internet arguer :) I know that these discussions can get far afield from where they started. But yes, I absolutely take China's success as a demonstration that 'competent autocracy' is an effective political & social system. Similarly, you specifically said 'so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism' so I named not just 2- but 2 of the absolutely most smashingly successful of the last hundred years. They're incredible examples to the contrary!
>I use Persson, Roland and Tabellini's model extensively to discuss why I think the theory for separation of powers fails, you might recall
I re-read your book, I get the argument. Sure, the separate branches of government could conceivably be completely unable to reach an agreement on something. I would use this opportunity to argue against mixing PR & presidentialism. But also, you could use this argument against any kind of strong institution that isn't the legislature. "Can't have an independent judiciary, what if they have an unresolvable constitutional conflict with parliament? Can't have federalism." Etc. I think if you're a healthy society, you're able to manage those conflicts without some kind of epic collapse. If you can't manage them, then your society is terminally broken and no system of government will help you.
>Lastly, you have never addressed the points of the post itself. Would you be fine with a legislature headed by a single person?
I am reading Ian Dunt's How Westminster Works right now, and he argues this is literally the case in Britain now? He says (maybe a bit hyperbolically) that party discipline is so strong in Britain that the government does *whatever* they want, and just whips/cowes parliament into submission. My argument is that, with its vastly higher levels of party discipline and the need to maintain the executive, you get a *weaker* parliament. The idea that an MP 'represents' a district is a joke. He or she is operating in a hierarchical system unthinkable in the US.
I am saying that in order to have a legitimately powerful, responsive, independent legislature, they need to be elected on fixed terms. They need to be able to vote their district, or their principles, how they choose without worrying about early elections. You could never have McCain blocking ACA repeal in a parliamentary system. Both parties joining together to investigate Iran-Contra in the 80s, which meant Republicans investigating their own President. Congress overriding Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution in 1973. Republican Senators quietly telling Nixon that he'd lose an impeachment bid and that it's time to resign. Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar breaking with Bush in 2007 to criticize the Iraq War and call for troop withdrawals.
>Ganghoff`s proposal of a semi-parliamentary system
I read 20ish pages of it, then forgot about it. It's on my to-do list. Seems interesting and I am not opposed
| the separate branches of governmentcould conceivably be completely unable to |reach an agreement on something
Very strong understatement. Separate branches of government have been completelyunable to reach agreements several times. Coups in Latin America very often arise from this. And yes, I do think that having a final arbiter of what the societal choice will be, with that arbiter in parliament, is a good thing. Parliamentary sovereignty has been pretty good for the countries which adopted it. Judicial checks are a recent innovation in parliamentary countries, and I don't think they have had positive effects.
|this is literally the case in Britain now?
I don't think this author can possibly be thinking this compares to presidential countries. Boris Johnson was removed by his own party. As was Liz Truss. Sunak called early elections because he realized he didn't have enough support. Nothing comparable happens in presidential countries.
My question was in reference to constitutions - would you be ok with a president and a single person who *legally* had all the power to implement legislation?
>would you be ok with a president and a single person who *legally* had all the power to implement legislation?
I don't understand the question. As I said at the beginning, I want a a decentralized government made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates. You need a different Senator for Florida than for Michigan, or Amazonas and Sao Paulo, or Bavaria and Hamburg. So no, of course not.
I'd be interested to hear you engage with my point that you need fixed terms in order to have a real, independent, powerful legislature. How can you really represent the interests of Florida or Amazonas or Bavaria if you're worried that voting against the government will collapse the coalition or cause early elections? The executive has more power over the legislature in a parliamentary system, not less. 'When push comes to shove I can't advocate for my state because the party whip ordered me not to' in FPTP. Or, 'oops I guess I have to prioritize the small extremist party in our coalition that got 7%, so their interests have to come before my state, can't risk early elections' in PR
I meant to engage with your point, but missed it in my answer.
The fact is I largely agree with you. Executives dissolving parliaments is generally bad. But experience has shown that even where executives do have that sort of prerogative, parliaments are far from powerless against executives, as the Boris Johnson situation exemplifies and empirical evidence on outcomes of parliamentary countries where this possibility is present confirm. So I prioritize not having a strong president, where the evidence for bad outcomes is much greater, than on this issue.
Now going back to my question. You want a legislature made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates. I assume you feel very strongly about this, as do I. Then why are you comfortable with an executive which is not made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates? That is what my question is about.
Just to elaborate on point 3- again, you're overly focused on the president part, and not enough on the legislature. I want an independent legislature unafraid to reject a budget or a major bill if it doesn't suit their district. This requires fixed terms. In a parliamentary system, they're too afraid that rejecting the executive on something will bring early elections. I want that level of independence! Which means fixed terms, which means no parliament
A funny thing is that Parlamentarianism is a happy accident. It was developed mostly in monarchies as a consequence of the legitimacy loss of the King: a smooth transfer of power from the King to the parliament chosen prime minister for several decades ended in the current arrangement.
Of course the arrangement is perfect in Scandinavia and Switzerland (a different path here), not so good in other countries. At the end the important thing is to have vote trading and plurality representation.
First pass the post and strong political parties can undo many advantages of parlamentarianism.
Do you mean strong political parties or strong partisanship? They are very different things. Strong parties are very much associated with good outcomes, while strong partisanship is detrimental. I claim that strong partisanship is a much greater risk in presidentialism because of how it incentivizes the expressive voting aspect.
I mean disciplined Parties, that is, parties where all MP vote together. With two truly disciplined parties, you have the full majoritarian scenario, and that is very similar to Presidentialism.
In the classical FPTP system, you have two parties but they are not disciplined, so there is true parlamentarían (=vote trading) politics. The current UK and US system is every day more disciplined, and then, the Parliament becomes a Chorus.
I'm critical of FPTP as well, and have become more hopeful of PR under presidentialism after recent Brazilian elections, where the most polarized leaders fared very badly compared to vanilla candidates.
Having said that, I don't think it makes a parliamentary country behave like a presidential one, even under FPTP. Personalized power is a different (and more dangerous) institution.
We are having new problems as a consequence of the destruction of local public opinion. FPTP and two party system were not that bad when local communities and news ecosystems worked as a force against partisan alignment.
In any case, for me parlamentarianism is simply a part of the consociational/majoritarian axis. This of course is not an argument against parlamentarianism, but the opposite: we understand very well why is better: it allows integration vs polarization.
1. South Korea, Taiwan, and France all seem 'fine' to me as functioning political institutions. (I understand that France is a weird hybrid, but they also have a president who is in many ways is more powerful than the US one- they can not only veto legislation but also call for early elections, institute emergency legislation unless the parliament has a super-majority, etc. So I'd certainly count them as 'presidential')
2. I don't doubt that presidentialism is maybe not an ideal system for a poorer country with weaker institutions, but I think developed countries can manage the risks just fine with appropriate controls in place (i.e. the US should really have stronger party nomination rules and not allow randos to run for their major party offices). I don't really think bicameralism or strong federalism is appropriate for new democracies either, but that doesn't mean rich countries can't handle either of those.
I.e. I would not recommend that a new democracy have 2 equally powerful chambers because this is too much friction for new institutions. But imagine telling Switzerland or Australia or the US that bicameralism leads to instability because it's not a best practice for a new African democracy. It's OK to say that some institutions are 'advanced moves for advanced players'. Same thing with an independent central bank, constitutional court, professional officer corps in the military, etc. etc.
3. You continue to not understand the benefits of presidentialism, which is around separating the presidential & legislative functions and *making it difficult to pass laws*. Philosophically it's about having a decentralized government made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates, and to get a law passed you have to persuade these disparate, sometimes fractious groups. The friction is a feature and not a bug. I don't want my legislature & executive fused, so that they can more easily pass laws, many of which will undoubtedly be dumb. Look at Gavin Newsom vetoing every foolish idea the California legislature has come up with in the past few years. Multiple veto points and friction are a good thing. The Economics Effects of Constitutions is a good book on this.
BTW, this is why the 'corporations don't have presidential systems' argument from your book doesn't work. Corporations don't need divided government, they should be actively engaged in profit-maximizing behavior. Governments are simply not corporations, frequently the best course of action for them is to do nothing, rather than pass a foolish law, give in to an influential pressure group, etc. Again, multiple veto points and friction are the point
On 1, I would point out the three countries you deemed presidential have prime ministers who are subject to confidence of parliament. In any pure presidential country, a constitution such as that of those countries would be perceived as "parliamentary". You call France "presidential" but that's not how most political scientists see it. It is most commonly classified as a premier-presidential form of semipresidentialism, which most view as behaving close to a parliamentary system. In any case, my point is not about nomenclature. You could call France presidential and countries which do not have the kind of legislative influence on the executive that France has (what I call presidential countries) some other name - hyperpresidential if you like. My argument is mainly against "hyperpresidential "countries. The idea that the president of France is more powerful than a regular president seems odd given that Macron just appointed a prime minister who has been overly critical of him - but one who was perceived to be able to keep support of parliament. But, as I write in the book, the American president is also no example of a typical president, they have fewer powers. In any case, I find that examples are good to illustrate but bad to make general points. I have never claimed it was impossible to do just fine under presidentialism nor that parliamentarism is a gurarantee of success. I claim that the odds are very different. "My grandmother smoked a pack a day and she lived one hundred years" is not an argument against the health risks of smoking.
On 2, the problem is that so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism, but countries which have been consistently parliamentary very often do. And you say that advanced economies do "just fine" with presidentialism and immediately turn to the challenges the US is facing with the system, suggesting that it is not as easy to do just fine.
On 3, I would humbly suggest that I do understand the arguments in favor of presidentialism, I just think they fail. I use Persson, Roland and Tabellini's model extensively to discuss why I think the theory for separation of powers fails, you might recall. Again, looking at example is hardly conclusive. And I would point out that having the "frictions" you mentioned hasn't stopped presidential countries from implementing all sorts of nonsense policies such as price controls. On the other hand, there is a large literature on how a lack of state capacity, an ability to act cohesively, hurts countries. You claim that corporations fail because they act in profit-maximizing behavior. This seems conveniently ad hoc. And "doing nothing" in the sense of "not taking an action" is very frequently the best course of action for a corporation. There is literature, for example, on how many will pursu mergers for the benefit of the vanity of the CEO when it does not make sense from a profit-seeking point of view. Corporations had to be legally told to be profit-seeking exactly because of the conflicts which arise in their operations. And still we see conflicts of interest among shareholders, directors and management arise all the time.
You assume I'm overly focused on the president part without providing any evidence that it is beneficial other than examples, when I have discussed the theory and the evidence at length.
Lastly, you have never addressed the points of the post itself. Would you be fine with a legislature headed by a single person? If not, why should we be ok with an executive headed by a single person?
If you are so keen on separation of powers, why not adopt Ganghoff`s proposal of a semi-parliamentary system whereby you keep the separation but with a collective executive as well. He says Australia is an example of this. I would classify them both as parliamentary, but am totally fine with his classification.
(What I feel less strongly about arguing)
>On 1, I would point out the three countries you deemed presidential have prime ministers who are subject to confidence of parliament
Sure. And Germany, Austria, and Finland all have presidents, I wouldn't call them presidential systems. My point is that South Korea, Taiwan, and France have a directly elected president with serious political power, and the potential for conflict with a separately elected parliament. In fact, all 3 of those countries invest more power in their president than the US does. 2 out of the 3 can dismiss parliament, I believe that at least 2 out of the 3 can pass emergency legislation solely by decree in a way that's unthinkable in the US, as Macron did recently with pension reform.
What power do parliaments have in those countries that a legislature doesn't under a presidential system, can someone tell me? Maybe Macron doesn't like Bernier, also Trump didn't like Pelosi, Obama didn't like Paul Ryan and Boehner, etc. etc.
>the problem is that so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism
South Korea and Taiwan, 2 of the most economically successful countries of the last hundred years
|Sure. And Germany, Austria, and Finland all have presidents, I wouldn't call them |presidential systems
Perhaps if presidential systems led just about any measure of what a society looks for, if the introduction of presidents was associated with the great enrichment, if there were several empirical studies pointing to them being more successful, if political science theory pointed to their advantage, when someone gave three examples of successful parliamentary countries and they all happened to be those that had presidents, it would be worth pointing out.
| South Korea and Taiwan, 2 of the most economically successful countries of the last |hundred years
China has been successful, but I don't take that one example as a demonstration that being officially communist is good or even that it isn't that bad.
>several empirical studies
I'm sorry, I don't have a high opinion of political 'science' as a quantitative or empirical field, and I don't take conclusions reached from these studies very seriously. 'Countries' are not equivalent units that can be studied in this manner. Constructing some artificial metrics and then averaging all of the parliamentary or presidential systems in the world..... I'm sorry, I don't believe in this kind of stuff. I hope you don't take offense if I say that bluntly.
>China
As a veteran Internet arguer :) I know that these discussions can get far afield from where they started. But yes, I absolutely take China's success as a demonstration that 'competent autocracy' is an effective political & social system. Similarly, you specifically said 'so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism' so I named not just 2- but 2 of the absolutely most smashingly successful of the last hundred years. They're incredible examples to the contrary!
I see. Well, I guess we won't advance a lot. Thank you for engaging.
(Separating what I feel strongly about arguing)
>I use Persson, Roland and Tabellini's model extensively to discuss why I think the theory for separation of powers fails, you might recall
I re-read your book, I get the argument. Sure, the separate branches of government could conceivably be completely unable to reach an agreement on something. I would use this opportunity to argue against mixing PR & presidentialism. But also, you could use this argument against any kind of strong institution that isn't the legislature. "Can't have an independent judiciary, what if they have an unresolvable constitutional conflict with parliament? Can't have federalism." Etc. I think if you're a healthy society, you're able to manage those conflicts without some kind of epic collapse. If you can't manage them, then your society is terminally broken and no system of government will help you.
>Lastly, you have never addressed the points of the post itself. Would you be fine with a legislature headed by a single person?
I am reading Ian Dunt's How Westminster Works right now, and he argues this is literally the case in Britain now? He says (maybe a bit hyperbolically) that party discipline is so strong in Britain that the government does *whatever* they want, and just whips/cowes parliament into submission. My argument is that, with its vastly higher levels of party discipline and the need to maintain the executive, you get a *weaker* parliament. The idea that an MP 'represents' a district is a joke. He or she is operating in a hierarchical system unthinkable in the US.
I am saying that in order to have a legitimately powerful, responsive, independent legislature, they need to be elected on fixed terms. They need to be able to vote their district, or their principles, how they choose without worrying about early elections. You could never have McCain blocking ACA repeal in a parliamentary system. Both parties joining together to investigate Iran-Contra in the 80s, which meant Republicans investigating their own President. Congress overriding Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution in 1973. Republican Senators quietly telling Nixon that he'd lose an impeachment bid and that it's time to resign. Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar breaking with Bush in 2007 to criticize the Iraq War and call for troop withdrawals.
>Ganghoff`s proposal of a semi-parliamentary system
I read 20ish pages of it, then forgot about it. It's on my to-do list. Seems interesting and I am not opposed
| the separate branches of governmentcould conceivably be completely unable to |reach an agreement on something
Very strong understatement. Separate branches of government have been completelyunable to reach agreements several times. Coups in Latin America very often arise from this. And yes, I do think that having a final arbiter of what the societal choice will be, with that arbiter in parliament, is a good thing. Parliamentary sovereignty has been pretty good for the countries which adopted it. Judicial checks are a recent innovation in parliamentary countries, and I don't think they have had positive effects.
|this is literally the case in Britain now?
I don't think this author can possibly be thinking this compares to presidential countries. Boris Johnson was removed by his own party. As was Liz Truss. Sunak called early elections because he realized he didn't have enough support. Nothing comparable happens in presidential countries.
My question was in reference to constitutions - would you be ok with a president and a single person who *legally* had all the power to implement legislation?
>would you be ok with a president and a single person who *legally* had all the power to implement legislation?
I don't understand the question. As I said at the beginning, I want a a decentralized government made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates. You need a different Senator for Florida than for Michigan, or Amazonas and Sao Paulo, or Bavaria and Hamburg. So no, of course not.
I'd be interested to hear you engage with my point that you need fixed terms in order to have a real, independent, powerful legislature. How can you really represent the interests of Florida or Amazonas or Bavaria if you're worried that voting against the government will collapse the coalition or cause early elections? The executive has more power over the legislature in a parliamentary system, not less. 'When push comes to shove I can't advocate for my state because the party whip ordered me not to' in FPTP. Or, 'oops I guess I have to prioritize the small extremist party in our coalition that got 7%, so their interests have to come before my state, can't risk early elections' in PR
I meant to engage with your point, but missed it in my answer.
The fact is I largely agree with you. Executives dissolving parliaments is generally bad. But experience has shown that even where executives do have that sort of prerogative, parliaments are far from powerless against executives, as the Boris Johnson situation exemplifies and empirical evidence on outcomes of parliamentary countries where this possibility is present confirm. So I prioritize not having a strong president, where the evidence for bad outcomes is much greater, than on this issue.
Now going back to my question. You want a legislature made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates. I assume you feel very strongly about this, as do I. Then why are you comfortable with an executive which is not made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates? That is what my question is about.
Just to elaborate on point 3- again, you're overly focused on the president part, and not enough on the legislature. I want an independent legislature unafraid to reject a budget or a major bill if it doesn't suit their district. This requires fixed terms. In a parliamentary system, they're too afraid that rejecting the executive on something will bring early elections. I want that level of independence! Which means fixed terms, which means no parliament