A funny thing is that Parlamentarianism is a happy accident. It was developed mostly in monarchies as a consequence of the legitimacy loss of the King: a smooth transfer of power from the King to the parliament chosen prime minister for several decades ended in the current arrangement.
Of course the arrangement is perfect in Scandinavia and Switzerland (a different path here), not so good in other countries. At the end the important thing is to have vote trading and plurality representation.
First pass the post and strong political parties can undo many advantages of parlamentarianism.
Do you mean strong political parties or strong partisanship? They are very different things. Strong parties are very much associated with good outcomes, while strong partisanship is detrimental. I claim that strong partisanship is a much greater risk in presidentialism because of how it incentivizes the expressive voting aspect.
I mean disciplined Parties, that is, parties where all MP vote together. With two truly disciplined parties, you have the full majoritarian scenario, and that is very similar to Presidentialism.
In the classical FPTP system, you have two parties but they are not disciplined, so there is true parlamentarían (=vote trading) politics. The current UK and US system is every day more disciplined, and then, the Parliament becomes a Chorus.
I'm critical of FPTP as well, and have become more hopeful of PR under presidentialism after recent Brazilian elections, where the most polarized leaders fared very badly compared to vanilla candidates.
Having said that, I don't think it makes a parliamentary country behave like a presidential one, even under FPTP. Personalized power is a different (and more dangerous) institution.
We are having new problems as a consequence of the destruction of local public opinion. FPTP and two party system were not that bad when local communities and news ecosystems worked as a force against partisan alignment.
In any case, for me parlamentarianism is simply a part of the consociational/majoritarian axis. This of course is not an argument against parlamentarianism, but the opposite: we understand very well why is better: it allows integration vs polarization.
On 1, I would point out the three countries you deemed presidential have prime ministers who are subject to confidence of parliament. In any pure presidential country, a constitution such as that of those countries would be perceived as "parliamentary". You call France "presidential" but that's not how most political scientists see it. It is most commonly classified as a premier-presidential form of semipresidentialism, which most view as behaving close to a parliamentary system. In any case, my point is not about nomenclature. You could call France presidential and countries which do not have the kind of legislative influence on the executive that France has (what I call presidential countries) some other name - hyperpresidential if you like. My argument is mainly against "hyperpresidential "countries. The idea that the president of France is more powerful than a regular president seems odd given that Macron just appointed a prime minister who has been overly critical of him - but one who was perceived to be able to keep support of parliament. But, as I write in the book, the American president is also no example of a typical president, they have fewer powers. In any case, I find that examples are good to illustrate but bad to make general points. I have never claimed it was impossible to do just fine under presidentialism nor that parliamentarism is a gurarantee of success. I claim that the odds are very different. "My grandmother smoked a pack a day and she lived one hundred years" is not an argument against the health risks of smoking.
On 2, the problem is that so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism, but countries which have been consistently parliamentary very often do. And you say that advanced economies do "just fine" with presidentialism and immediately turn to the challenges the US is facing with the system, suggesting that it is not as easy to do just fine.
On 3, I would humbly suggest that I do understand the arguments in favor of presidentialism, I just think they fail. I use Persson, Roland and Tabellini's model extensively to discuss why I think the theory for separation of powers fails, you might recall. Again, looking at example is hardly conclusive. And I would point out that having the "frictions" you mentioned hasn't stopped presidential countries from implementing all sorts of nonsense policies such as price controls. On the other hand, there is a large literature on how a lack of state capacity, an ability to act cohesively, hurts countries. You claim that corporations fail because they act in profit-maximizing behavior. This seems conveniently ad hoc. And "doing nothing" in the sense of "not taking an action" is very frequently the best course of action for a corporation. There is literature, for example, on how many will pursu mergers for the benefit of the vanity of the CEO when it does not make sense from a profit-seeking point of view. Corporations had to be legally told to be profit-seeking exactly because of the conflicts which arise in their operations. And still we see conflicts of interest among shareholders, directors and management arise all the time.
You assume I'm overly focused on the president part without providing any evidence that it is beneficial other than examples, when I have discussed the theory and the evidence at length.
Lastly, you have never addressed the points of the post itself. Would you be fine with a legislature headed by a single person? If not, why should we be ok with an executive headed by a single person?
If you are so keen on separation of powers, why not adopt Ganghoff`s proposal of a semi-parliamentary system whereby you keep the separation but with a collective executive as well. He says Australia is an example of this. I would classify them both as parliamentary, but am totally fine with his classification.
|Sure. And Germany, Austria, and Finland all have presidents, I wouldn't call them |presidential systems
Perhaps if presidential systems led just about any measure of what a society looks for, if the introduction of presidents was associated with the great enrichment, if there were several empirical studies pointing to them being more successful, if political science theory pointed to their advantage, when someone gave three examples of successful parliamentary countries and they all happened to be those that had presidents, it would be worth pointing out.
| South Korea and Taiwan, 2 of the most economically successful countries of the last |hundred years
China has been successful, but I don't take that one example as a demonstration that being officially communist is good or even that it isn't that bad.
| the separate branches of governmentcould conceivably be completely unable to |reach an agreement on something
Very strong understatement. Separate branches of government have been completelyunable to reach agreements several times. Coups in Latin America very often arise from this. And yes, I do think that having a final arbiter of what the societal choice will be, with that arbiter in parliament, is a good thing. Parliamentary sovereignty has been pretty good for the countries which adopted it. Judicial checks are a recent innovation in parliamentary countries, and I don't think they have had positive effects.
|this is literally the case in Britain now?
I don't think this author can possibly be thinking this compares to presidential countries. Boris Johnson was removed by his own party. As was Liz Truss. Sunak called early elections because he realized he didn't have enough support. Nothing comparable happens in presidential countries.
My question was in reference to constitutions - would you be ok with a president and a single person who *legally* had all the power to implement legislation?
I meant to engage with your point, but missed it in my answer.
The fact is I largely agree with you. Executives dissolving parliaments is generally bad. But experience has shown that even where executives do have that sort of prerogative, parliaments are far from powerless against executives, as the Boris Johnson situation exemplifies and empirical evidence on outcomes of parliamentary countries where this possibility is present confirm. So I prioritize not having a strong president, where the evidence for bad outcomes is much greater, than on this issue.
Now going back to my question. You want a legislature made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates. I assume you feel very strongly about this, as do I. Then why are you comfortable with an executive which is not made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates? That is what my question is about.
What do you think about fixed term parliaments as a possible compromise? I think I made my case that legislatures need to be on fixed terms in order to have sufficient independence to really represent their constituents. This is not compatible with the whips making or threatening to make any given law a confidence motion, something the House of Lords is notorious for. And, that I see a certain amount of friction in getting laws passed as a feature and not a bug.
So how about a fixed term of 4 years, with individually elected politicians from single member districts? I'm flexible on whether you want to include an out if they absolutely cannot agree on a budget, or if the system is bicameral and the 2 houses can't agree on something. Fixed term parliaments are definitely a 'thing', Norway has done them for over a century, and most of Australia's state governments are fixed at this point. I understand that the UK had a mixed experience with it. (I think Canada is sort of fixed now too?)
Voters elect the House, House selects a PM who serves at their pleasure. Said PM can be replaced with a constructive vote of no confidence. There'd be less party discipline and certainly more friction in getting laws passed. I've been warming up to this as a best of both worlds situation?
*Maxwell Stearns had a book out last year where he basically argues for the US to use this as well. He has a few quirks, like that removing the PM would require a 60% supermajority
A funny thing is that Parlamentarianism is a happy accident. It was developed mostly in monarchies as a consequence of the legitimacy loss of the King: a smooth transfer of power from the King to the parliament chosen prime minister for several decades ended in the current arrangement.
Of course the arrangement is perfect in Scandinavia and Switzerland (a different path here), not so good in other countries. At the end the important thing is to have vote trading and plurality representation.
First pass the post and strong political parties can undo many advantages of parlamentarianism.
Do you mean strong political parties or strong partisanship? They are very different things. Strong parties are very much associated with good outcomes, while strong partisanship is detrimental. I claim that strong partisanship is a much greater risk in presidentialism because of how it incentivizes the expressive voting aspect.
I mean disciplined Parties, that is, parties where all MP vote together. With two truly disciplined parties, you have the full majoritarian scenario, and that is very similar to Presidentialism.
In the classical FPTP system, you have two parties but they are not disciplined, so there is true parlamentarían (=vote trading) politics. The current UK and US system is every day more disciplined, and then, the Parliament becomes a Chorus.
I'm critical of FPTP as well, and have become more hopeful of PR under presidentialism after recent Brazilian elections, where the most polarized leaders fared very badly compared to vanilla candidates.
Having said that, I don't think it makes a parliamentary country behave like a presidential one, even under FPTP. Personalized power is a different (and more dangerous) institution.
We are having new problems as a consequence of the destruction of local public opinion. FPTP and two party system were not that bad when local communities and news ecosystems worked as a force against partisan alignment.
In any case, for me parlamentarianism is simply a part of the consociational/majoritarian axis. This of course is not an argument against parlamentarianism, but the opposite: we understand very well why is better: it allows integration vs polarization.
On 1, I would point out the three countries you deemed presidential have prime ministers who are subject to confidence of parliament. In any pure presidential country, a constitution such as that of those countries would be perceived as "parliamentary". You call France "presidential" but that's not how most political scientists see it. It is most commonly classified as a premier-presidential form of semipresidentialism, which most view as behaving close to a parliamentary system. In any case, my point is not about nomenclature. You could call France presidential and countries which do not have the kind of legislative influence on the executive that France has (what I call presidential countries) some other name - hyperpresidential if you like. My argument is mainly against "hyperpresidential "countries. The idea that the president of France is more powerful than a regular president seems odd given that Macron just appointed a prime minister who has been overly critical of him - but one who was perceived to be able to keep support of parliament. But, as I write in the book, the American president is also no example of a typical president, they have fewer powers. In any case, I find that examples are good to illustrate but bad to make general points. I have never claimed it was impossible to do just fine under presidentialism nor that parliamentarism is a gurarantee of success. I claim that the odds are very different. "My grandmother smoked a pack a day and she lived one hundred years" is not an argument against the health risks of smoking.
On 2, the problem is that so few countries ever become "advanced" under presidentialism, but countries which have been consistently parliamentary very often do. And you say that advanced economies do "just fine" with presidentialism and immediately turn to the challenges the US is facing with the system, suggesting that it is not as easy to do just fine.
On 3, I would humbly suggest that I do understand the arguments in favor of presidentialism, I just think they fail. I use Persson, Roland and Tabellini's model extensively to discuss why I think the theory for separation of powers fails, you might recall. Again, looking at example is hardly conclusive. And I would point out that having the "frictions" you mentioned hasn't stopped presidential countries from implementing all sorts of nonsense policies such as price controls. On the other hand, there is a large literature on how a lack of state capacity, an ability to act cohesively, hurts countries. You claim that corporations fail because they act in profit-maximizing behavior. This seems conveniently ad hoc. And "doing nothing" in the sense of "not taking an action" is very frequently the best course of action for a corporation. There is literature, for example, on how many will pursu mergers for the benefit of the vanity of the CEO when it does not make sense from a profit-seeking point of view. Corporations had to be legally told to be profit-seeking exactly because of the conflicts which arise in their operations. And still we see conflicts of interest among shareholders, directors and management arise all the time.
You assume I'm overly focused on the president part without providing any evidence that it is beneficial other than examples, when I have discussed the theory and the evidence at length.
Lastly, you have never addressed the points of the post itself. Would you be fine with a legislature headed by a single person? If not, why should we be ok with an executive headed by a single person?
If you are so keen on separation of powers, why not adopt Ganghoff`s proposal of a semi-parliamentary system whereby you keep the separation but with a collective executive as well. He says Australia is an example of this. I would classify them both as parliamentary, but am totally fine with his classification.
|Sure. And Germany, Austria, and Finland all have presidents, I wouldn't call them |presidential systems
Perhaps if presidential systems led just about any measure of what a society looks for, if the introduction of presidents was associated with the great enrichment, if there were several empirical studies pointing to them being more successful, if political science theory pointed to their advantage, when someone gave three examples of successful parliamentary countries and they all happened to be those that had presidents, it would be worth pointing out.
| South Korea and Taiwan, 2 of the most economically successful countries of the last |hundred years
China has been successful, but I don't take that one example as a demonstration that being officially communist is good or even that it isn't that bad.
I see. Well, I guess we won't advance a lot. Thank you for engaging.
| the separate branches of governmentcould conceivably be completely unable to |reach an agreement on something
Very strong understatement. Separate branches of government have been completelyunable to reach agreements several times. Coups in Latin America very often arise from this. And yes, I do think that having a final arbiter of what the societal choice will be, with that arbiter in parliament, is a good thing. Parliamentary sovereignty has been pretty good for the countries which adopted it. Judicial checks are a recent innovation in parliamentary countries, and I don't think they have had positive effects.
|this is literally the case in Britain now?
I don't think this author can possibly be thinking this compares to presidential countries. Boris Johnson was removed by his own party. As was Liz Truss. Sunak called early elections because he realized he didn't have enough support. Nothing comparable happens in presidential countries.
My question was in reference to constitutions - would you be ok with a president and a single person who *legally* had all the power to implement legislation?
I meant to engage with your point, but missed it in my answer.
The fact is I largely agree with you. Executives dissolving parliaments is generally bad. But experience has shown that even where executives do have that sort of prerogative, parliaments are far from powerless against executives, as the Boris Johnson situation exemplifies and empirical evidence on outcomes of parliamentary countries where this possibility is present confirm. So I prioritize not having a strong president, where the evidence for bad outcomes is much greater, than on this issue.
Now going back to my question. You want a legislature made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates. I assume you feel very strongly about this, as do I. Then why are you comfortable with an executive which is not made up of multiple individuals accountable to different electorates? That is what my question is about.
What do you think about fixed term parliaments as a possible compromise? I think I made my case that legislatures need to be on fixed terms in order to have sufficient independence to really represent their constituents. This is not compatible with the whips making or threatening to make any given law a confidence motion, something the House of Lords is notorious for. And, that I see a certain amount of friction in getting laws passed as a feature and not a bug.
So how about a fixed term of 4 years, with individually elected politicians from single member districts? I'm flexible on whether you want to include an out if they absolutely cannot agree on a budget, or if the system is bicameral and the 2 houses can't agree on something. Fixed term parliaments are definitely a 'thing', Norway has done them for over a century, and most of Australia's state governments are fixed at this point. I understand that the UK had a mixed experience with it. (I think Canada is sort of fixed now too?)
Voters elect the House, House selects a PM who serves at their pleasure. Said PM can be replaced with a constructive vote of no confidence. There'd be less party discipline and certainly more friction in getting laws passed. I've been warming up to this as a best of both worlds situation?
*Maxwell Stearns had a book out last year where he basically argues for the US to use this as well. He has a few quirks, like that removing the PM would require a 60% supermajority