Why advocate for parliamentarism?

Digging the well before we are thirsty

Parliament of The Gambia

I have written about how surprisingly persuasive the parliamentary cause is. You might want to check the post, but I essentially make the case based on my personal experience. I have tried to persuade people of hundreds of things in my life, with little success. Parliamentarism is the one thing there is a good chance you will leave a conversation with me convinced it really does matter and is superior to presidentialism. When it comes to convincing people that advocating for parliamentarism is a good use of their time, alas, it seems I return to my general not-that-persuasive self. In this International Day of Parliamentarism, I am working to correct this.

Before making my case, let us get a few things out of the way. Yes, I am aware that the chances that the tens of presidential countries will suddenly realize the errors of their way and adopt parliamentarism are slim. Institutional inertia is a powerful force. But relative presidential versus parliamentary power is always changing, so being in a presidential country with little chance of going full parliamentary does not mean you can improve a bit, nor does being in a parliamentary country which will not become presidential overnight protect you from creeping presidential aspects.

My point today, however, is different. If you are anything like me, you do not put much thought on what t-shirt you will wear on any given day. You just grab whatever one is on the top of the drawer, particularly if you are in a rush. After reading “Shock to the System: Coups, Elections, and War on the Road to Democratization”, by Michael K. Miller, I have become convinced[1] that major constitutional change often happens in a very similar way to the one I pick my t-shirts. Arrangements linger for a while. Sometimes, a shock affects the system (hence the name of the book) which provoke major changes all at once. But the direction of change is not determined by a deep, society-wide reflection on what institutions will better serve the country, there is no time for that. What happens is that elites with influence over those directions – if they are inclined to implement inclusive institutions – will pick the type of institutional arrangement most prominent for them at the time. This often-hurried choice, however, will have long-lasting consequences.

Which brings me to a second book I read recently: “Constitutional Law and the Politics of Ethnic Accommodation: Institutional Design in Afghanistan”, by Bashir Mobasher. As many of us vividly remember, following the American-led occupation of Afghanistan there were fervent vows and high hopes of implementing a strong democracy in the country. The comparative political science consensus about the superiority of parliamentarism was even stronger then (that is, before the publication of Cheibub’s “Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy”) than it is now. Yet Mobasher shows that, contrary to a common view that Americans do not push for presidentialism in other countries, that was exactly the type of constitution the suddenly extremely influential American officials sought.

Mobasher makes a compelling case that the constitutional design of a very weak parliament vis-à-vis the president effectively doomed the democratic prospects of Afghanistan, which, under a different, parliamentary, constitution, could have been much better.

Why did the framers of Afghanistan’s constitution pick presidentialism? Quite simply, it was the system they were more familiar with, the one they associated with strong democracy. Had the comparative political science consensus broken out of academia into the ranks of bureaucracy, the lives of millions of Afghans might have been completely different, and much better.

For me, reading Mobasher’s arguments is particularly sobering. Ever since I learned of the benefits of parliamentarism I noticed that Afghanistan had a presidential constitution and Iraq a parliamentary one, and that Afghanistan was faring much worse than Iraq, despite expectations being the reverse early on. When democracy was officially ended, and everyone was convinced that deep structural Afghan-specific factors were the whole story and that the constitution played no role, I was not convinced, but I was still completely unfamiliar with the situation so I would not pass judgment. Mobasher’s book shows that the constitution was a key factor (the key factor, in his view) for the failure.

Comparative political scientists could have warned about the risks when the constitution was being drafted. But they were not top-of-mind; a political scientist that did have an influence was a specialist in Afghanistan, and he argued for presidentialism. So did the American ambassador then – also not a comparativist – who argued Afghanistan needed a “strong president” and that a parliamentary monarchy was not a “modern” form of government. Can we blame those who picked their advice? I don’t think so. As I argue in the book, there is an unexamined consensus so strong we don’t even notice it, like fish don’t notice water, that local circumstances are the determinant factor for the failure or success of societies.

Millions of people have a less thriving life because of presidentialism. The causal relationship to any specific life, however is much more difficult to grasp than, say, in the case of someone who lost a limb due to war. But those consequences are still real. These people will miss more chances to be more prosperous; to be free to speak their minds; to live in a more comfortable house; to have secure access to food; to get proper health care. If advocating for parliamentarism can increase the chances that they don’t have to go through that even a teeny tiny bit, I think it is still worth it. But even setting that aside, advocating parliamentarism is a duty, so that we make sure next time there is a choice that must be made, we don’t impose upon any future society unnecessary challenges like those the Afghans had to face. Parliamentarism has to be the t-shirt on the very top of the stack.

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[1] A loyal reader (my dad?) might be wondering if this means a radical change from the views I expressed, along with Otaviano Canuto, on the paper “It’s Evolution, Baby – how institutions can improve without critical junctures.” Though the book has tempered my views somewhat, by no means it was a radical change. First, “Shock to the System” deals with democratization episodes, while our paper is about increases in the inclusiveness of institutions in general. Second, Miller’s book in fact argues that the most reliable way to democratize and keep it that way is through an evolutionary path. While shocks catalyze democratization, the democracies they engender often don’t last long.